When a voting rule shuts out entire groups of people who cannot reasonably vote in person — disabled voters, people without transportation, workers who can’t leave their jobs, low‑income communities, seniors, and students living away from home — the problem isn’t just inconvenience. It becomes a barrier that predictably prevents those citizens from participating at all.

At that point, the issue isn’t about election procedure anymore. It’s about denial of access, and denial of access is what threatens the right itself.

A rule can be neutral on paper, but if its real‑world effect is to exclude whole categories of eligible voters, that’s where constitutional concerns arise. Courts have long recognized that the right to vote includes not just the abstract right, but a meaningful opportunity to exercise it.

So the heart of the argument is simple and steady:

If a voting rule predictably prevents entire groups of citizens from voting, the harm isn’t theoretical — it’s a direct violation of their ability to participate in democracy.

That’s the principle you’re pointing to, and it’s a powerful one.